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Abstract
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party
can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any veri-
able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore
incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled
by the parties the pure threat of using the legal system may su¢ ce
to make the principal implement rst-best e¤ort. As is shown in the
paper, this nding is rather robust. In particular, it holds for sit-
uations where the agent is protected by limited liability, where the
parties have di¤erent technologies in the litigation contest, or where
the agent is risk averse.
Key Words: double-sided moral hazard; e¢ ciency wage; litigation
contest; settlement
JEL Classication: D86, J33, K41.
We would like to thank Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont for helpful comments.
Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), grant SFB/TR 15
(Governance and the E¢ ciency of Economic Systems), is gratefully acknowledged.
yDepartment of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113
Bonn, Germany, e-mail: oliver.guertler@uni-bonn.de, phone: +49-228-739214.
zDepartment of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113
Bonn, Germany, e-mail: m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de, phone: +49-228-739211.
1
1 Introduction
In many contractual relationships, e¤ort choice by an agent is observable
by him and the principal but unveriable by a third party. If there does
not exist any veriable performance signal in this situation, a double-sided
moral hazard problem will arise: Given that the agent has to move rst by
choosing e¤ort, the principal will ex-post withhold any payment by claiming
that the agent has only exerted poor e¤ort. Given that the principal should
be the rst mover who has to pay the agent before the latter one chooses
e¤ort we have just the reversed problem. Now the agent optimally chooses
zero e¤ort after having received the principals payment. Since in both cases
the rst-moving party anticipates the opportunistic behavior of the second
mover, no contractual relationship will form in equilibrium.
However, in practice contracts are signed even in situations in which
the parties cannot rely on a veriable performance signal. In our paper,
this somewhat puzzling observation is explained by the possibility that a
contracting party can go to court if the other party has reneged on the
contract. We show that a litigation can be used to restore performance
incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the
parties the pure threat of using the legal system may su¢ ce to make the
principal implement rst-best e¤orts.1 As is shown in the paper, this nding
is rather robust. Settlement will typically lead to the rst-best outcome
even in situations where the agent is protected by limited liability, where
the parties have di¤erent technologies in the litigation contest, or where the
agent is risk averse. Furthermore, the settlement solution will in general not
depend on whether litigation costs are allocated according to the American
1Note that in practice a large number of lawsuits are settled; see, for example, Spier
(forthcoming).
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Rule (i.e. each party has to bear its own litigation costs) or according to the
English Rule (i.e. the losing party must pay for both its own costs and those
of the winner).
The contract considered throughout the paper is rather simple since the
only veriable information is whether the agent and the principal have signed
a contract and what payments are made by the principal. However, if one
party has reneged on the contract it can be sued by the other party. In that
situation, both parties participate in a litigation contest in which resources
can be invested to produce evidence for ones case. Given the means of ev-
idence for both parties, the court will decide for or against the defendant
with a certain probability. The contract consists of three parts. First, it
contains a lump-sum payment by the principal given to the agent ex-ante
when the contract is signed. Second, the principal species a certain e¤ort
level which is requested from the agent; e¤ort is unveriable but via a lit-
igation contest the betrayed party gets the chance to enforce the contract.
Finally, the contract species a bonus which is paid to the agent as a kind of
deferred compensation if the agent has chosen the promised e¤ort. Note that
without litigation we still have a double-sided moral hazard problem as the
principal may claim a low e¤ort level in order to withhold the ex-post bonus,
and the agent may shirk by choosing zero e¤ort although he has accepted
the contract and received the lump-sum wage by the principal.
In the literature, we can nd di¤erent approaches to cope with the prob-
lem of double-sided moral hazard due to unveriable e¤ort. Perhaps, the
most prominent approach is based on the use of implicit agreements (or
reputation) which may become self-enforcing within a repeated-game set-
ting. Unfortunately, self-enforcement needs several additional assumptions
to hold for the dynamic contract. Another approach is given by rank-order
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tournaments. Here the double-sided moral hazard problem is solved by the
principals commitment to pay certain tournament prizes which have been
xed in advance (Malcomson 1984). However, tournament contracts need at
least two agents who perform identical tasks. Moreover, idiosyncratic prob-
lems like favoritism and bribes, sabotage, or collusion may make the use of
tournaments rather unattractive. Similar to tournaments, the two contract-
ing parties may involve a third party.2 For example, as the principal can
observe (but not verify) the agents e¤ort he can credibly commit himself to
pay a prespecied bonus either to the agent (in case of su¢ cient e¤ort) or
to a third party (in case of a poor e¤ort choice).3 If the third party is risk
neutral it can pay a lump sum to the principal ex-ante so that it makes zero
expected prots. However, again side contracting, favoritism and related
problems may imply that this third-party solution does not work.
The approach suggested in this paper only needs the basic assumption
that contracting parties can make use of the legal system if one of them has
broken the contract. Going to court gives the injured party a positive proba-
bility to enforce the contract. Interestingly, on the one hand high transaction
costs of the litigants (e.g. fees for lawyers) can improve the use of an ini-
tial lump-sum payment to the agent as an incentive device since these costs
would considerably harm the agent when being sued by the principal. On
the other hand, we can show that eliminating transaction or litigation costs
by settlement leads to the rst-best solution in a broad setting of possible
contractual problems including limited liability and risk aversion. Hence, the
approach used in this paper has the nice properties that it is fairly realistic
and rather robust to cope with the problem of double-sided moral hazard.
2In case of a tournament, each agent serves as a third party for the principal when
contracting with another agent since the principal must pay o¤ the high winner prize to
one of the agents.
3See, for instance, MacLeod (2003).
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Our paper combines three strands in the economic literature. First, it
is related to the work on litigation and settlement.4 This strand of litera-
ture typically considers an abstract situation in which an injurer has harmed
another party and then addresses topics like the private information of the
single parties, the structure of the settlement process, the optimal design of
damage awards and the impact of allocating litigation costs on the proba-
bility of a trial. While this literature o¤ers a precise economic analysis of
the legal procedure of litigation and settlement, the focus is usually not on
principal-agent contracts as a specic application. However, our paper is
structured in the reversed manner. We only use litigation and settlement as
abstract instruments to enforce contractual agreements without discussing
legal details, and rather focus on the optimal contract design.
The second strand of literature deals with litigation contests.5 In this
literature, the two litigants invest resources (like fees for lawyers) to win the
trial. The more resources they invest the higher will be their probability of
winning but also their costs. Within a game-theoretic analysis the strategic
behavior of the two contestants is analyzed. The papers on litigation contests
ask, for example, how simultaneous versus sequential moving of the litigants,
the delegation to lawyers or the use of di¤erent rules of allocating legal costs
inuence the litigantsequilibrium strategies. Our paper also uses a contest
game to sketch the litigation process. However, the main part of the paper is
based on the general contest-success function introduced by Dixit (1987) and
not on the special case of a Tullock or logit-form contest which is typically
4See, among many others, Shavell (1982, 1989), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Spier
(1994a, 1994b), Daughety and Reinganum (2002). For an overview see Spier (forthcoming).
5See, for example, Tullock (1975, 1980), Katz (1988), Farmer and Pecorino (1999),
Bernardo et al. (2000), and Wärneryd (2000) on the analysis of litigation contests. More-
over, the paper is also in line with those contest papers that start with the assumption
of missing property rights which leaves room for struggling; see, e.g., Skaperdas (1992),
Konrad (2002).
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considered in the literature on litigation contests.
Our paper is most closely related to Bernardo, Talley and Welch (2000)
who also combine a principal-agent relationship with a litigation contest.
However, their paper di¤ers in several respects from ours. They consider
a more special setting for the principal-agent model (with two e¤ort levels
and two di¤erent outcomes) and the litigation contest (a Tullock or logit-
form type). Moreover, their contract does not specify a bonus for the agent
when being successful. Instead, the possibility of suing the agent in case of a
low outcome as well as legal presumptions are analyzed as substitutes for a
missing incentive scheme. Bernardo et al. assume that the damage is exoge-
nously given but in our paper the damage is endogenously determined by the
contract that should be enforced. Furthermore, in the paper by Bernardo et
al., only the agent may renege on the contract whereas in our model either
party can break the agreement. Since Bernardo et al. consider a hidden-
action model, the agent is also sued if output is low but he has chosen high
e¤ort. However, in our paper, we assume an incomplete-contract framework
with double-sided moral hazard, i.e. each party may break the contract. We
assume that the agents e¤ort is perfectly observable by the principal but
unveriable; the agent can only be successfully sued if he indeed has chosen
low e¤ort.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on e¢ ciency wages as in-
troduced by Becker and Stigler (1974) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). An
e¢ ciency wage is a rather high wage which can serve three di¤erent purposes
prevent the agent from shirking, decrease a rms rate of uctuation, or
work against adverse selection when lling vacant positions with candidates
from outside. In the last decade, the shirking approach within the concept
of e¢ ciency wages has been reconsidered by contract theorists. Tirole (1999,
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p. 745), La¤ont and Martimort (2002, p. 174) and Schmitz (2005) speak
of e¢ ciency wages when workers are protected by limited liability and are
paid a positive rent for incentive reasons. In our model, the agent receives
a lump-sum payment at the beginning of the contractual relationship which
is also in general associated with a positive rent. However, our approach
more closely follows the original notion of e¢ ciency wages by Becker-Stigler
and Shapiro-Stiglitz: In these papers, the authors (implicitly) assume that
there is not any veriable performance signal because otherwise the principal
would have used explicit incentive contracts. This important assumption is
in line with the main assumption of our paper but clearly di¤ers from the
approach by Tirole, La¤ont-Martimort and Schmitz who focus on explicit
incentive schemes based on a veriable performance signal.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the following section, the model
is described. Section 3 deals with the optimal contract under litigation,
whereas Section 4 focuses on settlement. Section 5 discusses the robustness
of the previous ndings, analyzing the implications of asymmetric contest-
success technologies, legal presumptions, risk aversion and the replacement
of the American Rule of allocating legal costs with the English Rule. The
nal section concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a contractual relationship between an agent A ("he") and a
principal P ("she"). Both are assumed to be risk neutral.6 If A accepts
the contract o¤ered by P , he will exert e¤ort e  0 which determines Ps
output (in monetary terms) q = e, i.e. e¤ort choice is identical with output.
6In Section 5, we consider a risk-averse agent.
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In order to have a non-trivial incentive problem, we assume that e¤ort e is
observable by both A and P but unveriable to a third party. E¤ort entails
costs for A which are described by c (e) with c0 (e) ; c00 (e) > 0 and c (0) = 0.
To guarantee an interior solution we assume that c0 (0) = 0 and c0 (e) =1 if
e!1. Both contracting parties, A and P , have zero reservation values.
In the following, we consider contracts of the form

w; e^; b^

. The wage
w is a xed payment to A at the beginning of the relationship when the
contract is signed.7 e^ denotes the e¤ort level that is requested by P . Finally,
b^ stands for the bonus which is promised A by P in case of having chosen
e  e^. We can show that under the optimal contract both w and b^ are
non-negative although the agent is not protected by limited liability (see the
Appendix). Hence, w.l.o.g. we will restrict the following analysis to contracts
with w  0 and b^  0. Note that the setting describes a double-sided moral
hazard problem. Without further provisions, no one would have an incentive
to stick to the contract because of the unveriability of e: On the one hand,
P can always save labor costs b^ by claiming that e < e^ irrespective of the
chosen e¤ort level. On the other hand, A can anticipate Ps behavior and,
moreover, he can choose e = 0 to minimize e¤ort costs without any sanctions
so far.
In practice, we often observe xed payments and promised bonuses with-
out the existence of veriable performance signals. Instead, there exist legal
institutions like labor courts which may enforce contractual claims. In order
to focus on this topic, we assume that, if one party reneges on its contractual
promise, it can be sued by the other party. Technically, we will consider
a litigation contest between A and P . Each party i (i = A;P ) can invest
monetary expenditures xi  0 to produce evidence in its favor and, hence,
7Hence, signing of the contract is veriable.
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to win the contest. For example, xi may describe fees for lawyers or money
for expert opinions and documentary evidence.8 Let p (xA; xP ) denote the
probability of A to win the litigation contest, that is p (xA; xP ) describes the
probability that the court decides in favor of party A. Therefore, Ps winning
probability is given by 1  p (xA; xB). Following Dixit (1987), we assume (i)
p (xA; xP ) = 1  p (xP ; xA), (ii) that p (xA; xP ) is twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable with p1 > 0, p11 < 0, p2 < 0, p22 > 0 and (iii) that p12 > 0, p > 0:5.9
Assumption (i) states that both parties apply the same contest-success tech-
nology (symmetry assumption). For example, A and P have the same access
to the market for lawyers and experts. According to assumption (ii), spend-
ing resources xi has positive but diminishing marginal e¤ects on ones own
probability of winning the contest. Finally, assumption (iii) is very intuitive,
too. If, initially, A chooses higher expenditures, a marginal increase in xP
makes it more attractive for A to increase xA as well. This is due to the more
intense competition the increase in Ps expenditures has caused. Similarly,
if, initially, xA < xP , an increase in xP makes the contest more uneven so
that it is benecial for the agent to invest less. Note that assumption (iii)
together with Youngs theorem implies that p21 > 0 , p > 0:5, which can
be interpreted analogously. Notice further that assumption (iii) is fullled
for the two most frequently used specications of p(xA; xP ), the logit-form
contest-success function10 and the probit-form contest-success function11.
In order to focus on the disciplining role of litigation, we introduce two
further assumptions: First, we abstract from the possibility of opportunistic
8We abstract from xed costs for the parties when ling a complaint. Of course, if such
costs are too high, creating incentives by litigation will not work.
9Here, subscripts of p (; ) denote the respective partial derivatives.
10See Tullock (1980). For a formal proof that assumption (iii) is fullled in both kinds
of contests see Dixit (1987).
11See, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981).
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suing, i.e. A (P ) can only successfully sue P (A) if e  e^ (e < e^) and b < b^.12
Second, we assume that the court will only decide to enforce or rescind the
contract

w; e^; b^

but not to impose an obligation to pay further damages on
the defendant. Otherwise, setting draconian sanctions can solve the incentive
problem. Formally, if A sues P in case of e  e^ and b < b^, P has to pay A
the promised bonus b^ with probability p (xA; xP ).13 This damage measure is
called expectation damages in legal practice.14 Expectation damages com-
pensate the injured party such that it is in the same position as it would
be under the performed contract. Higher damages than b^ are not allowed.
According to common law, a liquidated damage clause will not be enforced if
the purpose of the clause is pure punishing the breach of contract. If P sues
A in case of e < e^, A has to pay back w to P with probability 1  p (xA; xP ).
Higher damages than w are not feasible. According to the expectation mea-
sure, A should perfectly compensate P for the promised output so that P has
the same economic position as if the contract has been fullled. However, if it
is not possible to award damages measured in this way, the court will enforce
damages that give the injured party the same position it had at the time of
contracting (reliance measure).15 By following the reliance-damages rule, we
assume that the court does not know the underlying production technology
and, hence, enforces refunding of w.
The timing of the model is the following:
12Of course, payments w and b by P are veriable.
13Note that we do not consider the case that P pays a positive bonus b 2

0; b^

when
reneging on the contract which would result in a damage b^ b. If A has chosen e¤ort e < e^,
P has to pay no bonus to A by contract. Hence, any positive bonus clearly indicates that
A has fullled the contract.
14See Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984) on expectation damages, reliance damages
and restitution damages.
15Since P has not spent further reliance expenditures in our model, the reliance measure
and the restitution measure coincide here; see Shavell (1980, p. 471).
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1 2 3 4 5
-
P o¤ers A accepts A P possible
contract or chooses chooses litigation
w; e^; b^

rejects e¤ort e bonus b
First P o¤ers a contract

w; e^; b^

. Then A decides whether to accept
or reject the contract. If A rejects Ps o¤er, the game will end. If A has
accepted, then he will choose his unveriable e¤ort e  0. Then P decides
on the veriable payment b  0 to A. Finally, any contracting party can sue
the other one. However, by assumption, only if a party has reneged on the
contract, it can be successfully sued with a positive probability.
3 Contract Choice and Litigation
We solve the game by backward induction and start with the litigation stage.
Suppose that i 2 fA;Pg has not fullled the contract so that j 2 fA;Pg n fig
can go to court. In this case, i = A (i = P ) has to pay the damage D = w
(D = b^) to j if j = P (j = A) wins the litigation contest. Player js expected
utility from suing i is given by
D  p (xj; xi)  xj (1)
whereas is objective function in the contest is described by16
 D  p (xj; xi)  xi: (2)
16Recall that, by assumption (i), p (; ) is symmetric so that a permutation of subscripts
does not change the results.
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Note that it is optimal for either player to choose xi = xj = 0, if D = 0. Note
further that both objective functions are strictly concave. We assume that for
any strictly positive value of D an interior solution for the litigation contest
exists.17 The interior solution is characterized by the rst-order conditions
D  p1 (xj; xi) = 1 and  D  p2 (xj; xi) = 1. (3)
Recall that, due to the symmetry assumption, we have p (xj; xi) = 1  
p (xi; xj). Di¤erentiation with respect to xi yields p2 (xj; xi) =  p1 (xi; xj).
Inserting into (3) gives
D  p1 (xj; xi) = D  p1 (xi; xj) = 1. (4)
Hence, we have a symmetric solution (xj; xi) = (x; x) being described by
D  p1 (x; x) = 1. (5)
It is easy to see that x is monotonically increasing in D and can be written
as18
x := X (D) with X 0 () > 0. (6)
Existence of an interior solution implies that the expected gain from partic-
ipating in the litigation contest is non-negative:
G (D) :=
D
2
 X (D)  0: (7)
17Later, we apply the widely used contest-success function that has been introduced by
Tullock. If the power parameter is not too large, an interior solution will always exist in
the Tullock contest.
18To prove this, we make use of the implicit function theorem, from which we obtain
@x
@D =   p1(x
;x)
D[p11(x;x)+p12(x;x)]
. As p11 (x; x) < 0 and p12 (x; x) = 0, we have @x

@D > 0.
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At stage 4 of the game, P chooses a bonus payment b  0 for A. If A
has chosen e < e^ before, P will follow the contract and choose b = 0. If A
has chosen e  e^, again b = 0 will be Ps optimal response: according to (7),
it is more favorable for P to take part in the litigation contest than directly
paying b^. Altogether, in stage 4 P has the dominant action, not to pay b = b^
but b = 0 instead.
At the third stage, A has to decide on his e¤ort choice e. Of course, A
will either choose e = 0 or exactly e = e^. In any case, A anticipates that P
will not pay b = b^ in the next stage. If A decides to shirk (e = 0), he will be
sued by P and forgoes the possibility to take part in the litigation contest
on b^. If A sticks to the contract and chooses e = e^, he will retain the xed
payment w for sure and gets the expected gain G

b^

. Hence, As expected
utility from shirking is given by
EUA (e = 0) =
w
2
 X (w) , (8)
and his expected utility from sticking to the contract by
EUA (e = e^) = w +
b^
2
 X

b^

  c (e^) . (9)
By comparing (8) and (9), we obtain the no-shirking condition or incentive
constraint EUA (e = e^)  EUA (e = 0),
hw
2
+X (w)
i
+
"
b^
2
 X

b^
#
 c (e^) . (IC)
Condition (IC) shows that incentives for choosing e = e^ arise for two reasons:
The rst term in brackets denotes As benet from avoiding a litigation
contest on refunding w. The second term in brackets describes As expected
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gain from participating in a litigation contest on b^; A would lose this option
value in case of shirking (e = 0).
Notice that the agents participation constraint is given by
w +
"
b^
2
 X

b^
#
 c (e^) ; (PC)
which is automatically implied by constraint (IC). Hence, in the optimum
A always earns a non-negative rent and so always accepts the contract at
stage 2. Alternatively, it can be argued that the agent can always ensure a
non-negative payo¤ by accepting the contract and choosing e = 0. Hence, he
will never reject a contract o¤er.
Finally, at stage 1, P chooses the optimal contract

w; e^; b^

. She can
implement a positive e¤ort level by choosing w and b^ according to condition
(IC). In the optimum, (IC) holds with equality since P does not want to
waste money. Formally, this means that P chooses

w; e^; b^

in order to
maximize
e^  w   b^
2
 X

b^

(10)
subject to hw
2
+X (w)
i
+
"
b^
2
 X

b^
#
= c (e^) : (11)
It is easy to see that the solution to the maximization problem depends on
the function X (D). Therefore, it is impossible to say something about the
solution

w; e^; b^

without imposing some additional structure on X (D).
If, however, additional assumptions about X (D) are introduced, we obtain
nice and clear-cut results, as the following proposition shows:
Proposition 1 There exist two cut-o¤ values, x > 0 and ~x > 0 with x > ~x,
such that the following holds: (i) If X 0 (D)  x, 8D  0, the optimal con-
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tract is of the form

w > 0; e^ > 0; b^ = 0

. Given that a litigation contest
is not completely dissipative (G (D) > 0), the agent will earn a strictly pos-
itive rent. (ii) If X 0 (D)  ~x, 8D  0, the optimal contract is of the form
w = 0; e^ > 0; b^ > 0

. In this case, the agent will receive zero rent. (iii)
Otherwise, both w and b^ may be strictly positive.
Proof. The Lagrangian to the principals maximization problem is
L = e^  w   b^
2
 X

b^

+ 
 hw
2
+X (w)
i
+
"
b^
2
 X

b^
#
  c (e^)
!
;
with  as the Lagrange-multiplier. As Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we obtain
@L
@e^
= 1  c0 (e^)  0 (= 0, if e^ > 0)
@L
@w
=  1 + 

1
2
+X 0 (w)

 0 (= 0, if w > 0)
@L
@b^
=  1
2
 X 0

b^

+ 

1
2
 X 0

b^

 0

= 0, if b^ > 0

:
We begin by noting that the rst condition must be binding. Otherwise, we
had e^ = 0, which implies  ! 1, as c0 (0) = 0. From  ! 1, it follows
that @L
@w
> 0, for all w. This, in turn, implies w ! 1, which is clearly not
optimal for P . Moreover, at least one of the remaining two conditions must
bind, too. Otherwise, we would have w = b^ = 0, which, in turn, implies
e^ ! 0 and, accordingly,  ! 1. As argued before, this yields @L
@w
> 0,
which is a contradiction to w = 0.
Now, let X 0 (D) be so high (i.e. X 0 (D)  x) that the following condition
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always holds:
@L
@w
=  1 + 

1
2
+X 0 (w)

>
@L
@b^
=  1
2
 X 0

b^

+ 

1
2
 X 0

b^

, 
h
X 0 (w) +X 0

b^
i
+X 0

b^

>
1
2
In this case, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions directly imply w > 0 and b^ = 0.
Further, note that x > 0, as otherwise, the condition @L
@w
> @L
@b^
did not
necessarily hold. Similarly, if X 0 (D) is so low (i.e. X 0 (D)  ~x) that
@L
@w
<
@L
@b^
, 
h
X 0 (w) +X 0

b^
i
+X 0

b^

<
1
2
always holds, we obtain w = 0 and b^ > 0 from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Moreover, as  is nite (which follows from e^ > 0), the corresponding cut-o¤
value ~x is positive, too.
Finally, if X 0 (D) lies in-between the two cut-o¤ values, we cannot rank
@L
@w
and @L
@b^
unambiguously, which means that both, w and b^, may be strictly
positive.
In case (i), A can ensure himself a payo¤G (w) = w
2
 X (w) by choosing
e = 0. Accordingly, As net payo¤ from choosing e = e^ > 0 and bearing
costs c (e^) must be at least G (w), for, otherwise, A would deviate to e = 0.
This payo¤ and, therefore, As rent is strictly positive unless the litigation
contest is completely dissipative. In case (ii), we have w = 0. Inserting into
(11) yields
h
b^
2
 X

b^
i
= c (e^) so that (PC) becomes binding.
The proposition shows that in some situations the principal will only use
a wage payment w as incentive device. In this case, the agent always receives
a positive rent (unless X (w) = w
2
) so that we can speak of an e¢ ciency
wage w. Intuitively, the agent can always ensure himself a payo¤ w
2
 X (w)
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by choosing zero e¤ort. Hence, w
2
  X (w) represents a lower bound for
the agents equilibrium payo¤. If X (w) < w
2
, this lower bound is strictly
positive and the agent receives a rent. By setting w = 0 and b^ > 0, this
lower bound for the agents payo¤ becomes zero and so does his rent. This
explains why there are also situations in which the principal makes only use
of a deferred compensation b^. Finally, the principal may use an optimal mix
of both instruments w and b^ as well.
According to Proposition 1, the optimal contract crucially depends on
X 0 (D). To understand this, note thatX 0 (D) can be interpreted as a measure
of rent or gain dissipation in the respective litigation contest: The higher
X 0 (D) (for all D  0) the larger will be the amount of expenditures chosen
in the contest and, hence, the larger will be the dissipation rate (i.e. the
lower will be the gain G (D) from participating in the litigation contest).
Recall that, in equilibrium, the use of w for incentivizing A does not lead to
a litigation which implies zero litigation costs for P . Moreover, if A shirks
by choosing e = 0 he will gain G (w) from the subsequent litigation contest
on refunding w. The higher the dissipation rate the less attractive will be
shirking and the more e¤ective will be creating incentives via an e¢ ciency
wage w. However, a positive bonus b^ always implies that a litigation contest
takes place and that P has to bear litigation costs X

b^

. Altogether, if
X 0 (D) is generally high so that resource dissipation in the contest is large
(i.e. X 0 (D)  x, 8D  0) the principal will only use e¢ ciency wages w as
incentive device: w > 0 and b^ = 0. If, on the contrary, the dissipation
rate is generally low in a litigation contest (i.e. X 0 (D)  ~x, 8D  0) the
principal will solely rely on deferred compensation b^ to generate incentives
so that we obtain w = 0 and b^ > 0 in equilibrium.
It should be noted that there are two special cases, in which the rst-
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best e¤ort eFB is implemented.19 In the rst situation, we have complete
dissipation in the contest, and hence X (w) = w
2
. In this case, the agent does
not receive a rent, if incentives are induced via w. Moreover, if he shirks
and chooses e < 0 his expected benets from shirking, w=2, are completely
eliminated by the respective litigation costs X (w) = w=2. Consequently, the
threat of litigation would be so e¤ective that P prefers to induce e¢ cient
incentives since she can extract all e¢ ciency gains in this situation. In the
second case, X (D) = 0 so that there is no rent dissipation at all. Here,
the downside of the bonus payment disappears and the rst-best solution is
implemented by choosing w = 0 and b^

2
= c
 
eFB

.
To illustrate our previous results, we now consider a parameterized contest-
success function p (xA; xP ) which is widely used in the contest literature, in
particular for modeling litigation contests:20
p (xA; xP ) =
8><>:
xA
xA + x

P
if xA + xP > 0
1=2 otherwise
(12)
with  2 [0; 2] guaranteeing an interior solution.21 For the special case of
contest-success function (12), the rst-order conditions (3) lead to a symmet-
ric equilibrium with both A and P spending resources
x := X(D) =
D
4
(13)
19Note that here eFB describes the e¤ort maximizing e   c (e), i.e. rst-best e¤ort in
case of a risk-neutral agent. In Section 5, eFB denotes the e¢ cient e¤ort choice of an
agent who may be risk-averse.
20See, among many others, Tullock (1975, 1980), Katz (1988), Farmer and Pecorino
(1999), Bernardo et al. (2000), Wärneryd (2000), Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), Konrad
(2007), pp. 35-46.
21Notice that the Tullock contest-success function is not twice continuously di¤erentiable
at xA = xP = 0. However, X (D) is continuous everywhere.
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and realizing an expected gain
G(D) =
D
2

1  
2

(14)
from participating in the litigation contest. Hence, P maximizes
e^  w   b^2 + 
4
(15)
subject to w
2 + 
4
+ b^
2  
4
= c (e^) : (16)
Equation (16) shows that P can induce the same incentive level by either
spending one unit of w or 2+
2  units of b^. By substituting for b^ =
2+
2 w in
(15) we can see that creating incentives via b^ is more costly than via w as
long as (2+)
2
4(2 ) > 1 ,  >  :=
p
20   4. Hence, the optimal contract is
(w > 0; e^; 0) for  > ,

w  0; e^; b^  0

for  = , and

0; e^; b^ > 0

for  < . These ndings are very intuitive. They directly correspond to
the results of Proposition 1 on the cuto¤s x and ~x.22 If  gets higher, more
resources are wasted in the litigation contest. As explained before, P then
gains from relying more strongly on w and reducing b^.
Recall that the rst-best e¤ort, eFB = c0 1 (1), is only implemented in the
two extreme cases of no or full rent dissipation, i.e.  = 0 and  = 2. In all
other cases, the induced e¤ort is ine¢ ciently low, as the following corollary
(which can be derived using (15) and (16)) shows.
Corollary 1 Let p (xA; xP ) be described by (12). There exists a cut-o¤ value
22Here we have x = ~x =
p
20 4
4 .
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 so that P implements an e¤ort level e^ < eFB by choosing

w; e^; b^

=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

4c(e^)
2+
; c0 1
 
2+
4

; 0

; if  > 
w; c0 1
p
5 1
2

; b^

with
w
p
5 1
2
+ b^ 3 
p
5
2
= c

c0 1
p
5 1
2

;
if  = 
0; c0 1
 
2 
2+

; 4c(e^
)
2 

; if  < 
with  2 (0; 2).
4 Settlement
For the two parties as a whole, a litigation contest represents a pure waste
of resources. It is therefore not unreasonable to think that the principal
and the agent settle a conict peacefully instead of going to court. We
capture this possibility in the following way: Before a litigation contest takes
place, the two parties meet and bargain for a settlement. The outcome of
this bargaining process is assumed to be the Nash-bargaining solution, with
 2 [0; 1] denoting the principals bargaining power and 1   the agents.23
This implies that settlement will always take place, because it represents a
more e¢ cient way to solve the conict than the litigation contest.
Besides the possibility of settlement, the model is the same as in Section
2. As before, we assume w.l.o.g. that w; b^  0 so that A sues P for b^, if P
refuses to pay this bonus (after the agent has chosen the demanded e¤ort)
and P sues A for w, if the agent does not work as hard as initially promised.
The model is solved by backward induction, hence we start with the pos-
sible litigation contest for b^ at the end of the game. If it comes to this
23Note that  need not equal 1. A partys bargaining power in the settlement process
may thus di¤er from the ex ante bargaining power at the initial contract negotiation stage.
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contest, the agent will be successful with probability 1
2
and receive a payo¤
of b^
2
 X

b^

. Similarly, the principals payo¤ from the contest will be given
by   b^
2
  X

b^

. Note that these payo¤s also represent the partiesthreat
or disagreement utilities in the settlement process, in which they can save a
total amount of 2X

b^

. As mentioned before, this gain is always captured
and settlement always occurs. Together with our assumption on the par-
tiesrelative bargaining powers, this implies that the agents payo¤ in the
settlement stage is
EUSA =
b^
2
 X

b^

+ (1  ) 2X

b^

(17)
=
b^
2
+ (1  2)X

b^

;
while P receives
EUSP =  
b^
2
 X

b^

+ 2X

b^

(18)
=   b^
2
  (1  2)X

b^

:
As X

b^

 b^
2
, the principals payo¤ exceeds  b^, no matter how the ex
post bargaining power is distributed. Hence, she is again better o¤ by not
sticking to her promise and so by refusing to pay out the bonus. This is
of course anticipated by A and must be incorporated into his incentive and
participation constraints. If A sticks to his promise and chooses e¤ort e^,
he su¤ers from the e¤ort costs c(e^), but can keep the xed wage w and
additionally gets EUSA from the settlement process described before. If, on
the other hand, he deviates to e = 0, he is sued by the principal. Here, the
conict is again settled and the agent gets a payo¤ w   w
2
+ (1  2)X (w).
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Thus, the agents incentive constraint is given by
w   c(e^) + b^
2
+ (1  2)X

b^

 w   w
2
+ (1  2)X (w) (19)
, w
2
  c(e^) + b^
2
+ (1  2)

X

b^

 X (w)

 0:
Since w   w
2
+ (1  2)X (w)  0, the participation constraint is always
implied by the incentive constraint so that the latter constraint binds in the
optimum. The principals optimization problem at the contracting stage can
therefore be written as
max
e^;b^;w
e^  w   b^
2
 X

b^

+2X

b^

(20)
s.t.
hw
2
+X (w) 2 (1  )X (w)
i
+
"
b^
2
 X

b^

+2 (1  )X

b^
#
= c (e^) :
The bold expressions indicate the changes in the maximization problem due
to the possibility of settlement. Settlement a¤ects the situation in three ways:
First, P directly gains from the settlement, as the costly litigation contest at
the end of the game does not take place and the principal receives part of the
saved resources (unless her ex post bargaining power  is zero). Second, it
becomes more di¢ cult to incentivize the agent via w. In the model in Section
2, part of the incentive was provided by the resources X (w) that A had to
bear in the litigation contest, if deviating from the promised e¤ort. Due to
the settlement process, this disciplining device becomes less strong and the
incentive constraint harder to fulll. Finally, it becomes more attractive to
use b^ as an incentive device. This is due to the fact that the agent, in contrast
to the previous model, need not enter a costly litigation contest to get a share
of b^. In turn, he reacts more strongly to this kind of incentive.
Altogether, all these e¤ects make the use of b^ relatively more attractive
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for the principal. Indeed, under a mild additional assumption, she is even
able to implement the rst-best solution by solely relying on b^, as shown in
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Let settlement of the conict be possible and b
2
+(1  2)X  b
 c  eFB, with b 2 argmax
b^0
b^
2
+ (1  2)X

b^

. Then, the principal will
always set w = 0; b^

2
+(1  2)X

b^

= c(eFB) and e^ = eFB. In this way,
she will obtain the rst-best surplus as prot.
Proof. Let w = 0. Then, the incentive constraint reduces to (recall that
X(0) = 0)
b^
2
+ (1  2)X

b^

= c (e^) :
This can be inserted into the principals objective function, which then can
be rewritten as
EUP = e^  c(e^):
It directly follows that the principal receives the complete surplus to be pro-
duced. She chooses e^ in order to maximize this surplus, which leads to
the rst-best solution, e^ = eFB. Clearly, the principal could never receive
more than the rst-best surplus. Therefore, the initial choice of w = 0
was optimal, too.24 Finally, note that the incentive constraint becomes
b^
2
+ (1  2)X

b^

= c(eFB). This, however, can only be fullled, if
b^
2
+ (1  2)X

b^

 c(eFB), for some b^  0.
As discussed before, incentives can be provided via w or b^. In Section 3,
the trade-o¤between these two instruments was the following: If the agent is
incentivized via w, the principal has to leave him a rent or, in other words, has
24Note that this also justies our assumption w; b^  0 at the beginning of this section.
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to pay him an e¢ ciency wage. If b^ is used as an incentive device, a litigation
contest takes place, in which resources are wasted. With settlement, however,
a litigation contest is prevented and the litigation costs are not incurred.
Accordingly, this downside to the use of deferred compensation b^ disappears
and a pure bonus contract (with w = 0) is optimal. Moreover, as such a
contract yields no contractual frictions, the rst-best solution is achieved.25
Notice that the additional restriction imposed is indeed a rather mild one.
It states that the agents compensation payment in the settlement process
can become so high (if the bonus is determined appropriately) that the rst-
best e¤ort costs are covered. This is always the case, if the agents ex post
bargaining power is at least 0.5 or if the litigation contest is not excessively
wasteful. Given a contest-success function of the form (12), for instance, the
condition is always fullled for  < 2, no matter how the ex post bargaining
power is distributed. Hence, only in exceptional cases the condition may be
violated.
Proposition 2 is quite remarkable in light of the assumptions that e¤ort is
unveriable and the contract cannot be enforced, if the parties do not spend
resources for the production of evidence. What makes it even more remark-
able is the fact that, in equilibrium, no such resources are spent. Hence,
the pure threat of going to court and trying to enforce a claim legally helps
the parties to overcome all contractual problems. Furthermore, note that
optimal payments w and b^ are non-negative. Thus, even if the agent is
protected by limited liability, the principal will implement rst-best e¤ort:
Corollary 2 Let the condition of Proposition 2 be satised. If A is protected
by limited liability in the sense of w  0 and w + b^  0, again P will induce
25Note that this argumentation is similar to the argumentation in the special case from
Section 3, where a litigation contest took place, but no resources were dissipated, i.e.
where X (D) = 0.
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e¢ cient incentives e^ = eFB.
5 Discussion
5.1 Litigation Contest
Up to now, we have assumed a completely symmetric contest-success tech-
nology so that the likelihood of winning the litigation does not depend on
the identity of the investing party or whether the party was the one that has
reneged on the contract or not. However, in practice the litigants may have
access to lawyers and experts of di¤erent quality. Moreover, the party that
has broken the contract should have a lower winning probability than the
other party. Finally, legal presumptions may apply which either favor the
plainti¤ or the defendant. Altogether, in such asymmetric litigation contests
A and P usually have di¤erent expected gains of participating in the con-
test. Let GA (w) and GA

b^

(GP (w) and GP

b^

) denote As (Ps) expected
gains of participating in a litigation contest on w and b^, respectively. Now
conditions (10) and (11) can be rewritten as
e^  w   b^+GP

b^

(10)
w  GA (w) +GA

b^

= c (e^) : (11)
Inspection of (10) and (11) shows that GP (w) is irrelevant on the equilib-
rium path as shirking of A is prevented by incentive constraint (11). The
other three values, however, are important for the creation of incentives via
litigation. Incentive constraint (11) shows that inducing incentives via w will
become very e¤ective if A is a weak player in the w-contest (i.e. if GA (w) is
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small).26 However, the more A is favored (P is discriminated) in the contest
on b^ and, hence, the higher GA

b^

(the lower GP

b^

) the more e¤ective (the
more costly) will be inducing incentives via b^ according to (11) (according
to (10)).
We can also sketch the implications of risk-averse parties. From tour-
nament theory we know that a contestants risk premium may increase in
his e¤ort level which then leads to less investment and, therefore, lower ef-
fort costs in the contest.27 While low litigation costs make participation in
a litigation contest rather attractive, a risk-averse player naturally dislikes
a risky income lottery as dened by a contest. However, in principal-agent
relationships, the agent is typically more risk averse than the principal. If
A is su¢ ciently risk averse, creating incentives via w can become very ef-
fective since sticking to the contract guarantees A the deterministic income
w whereas shirking leads to a risky income lottery when being sued by P .
Hence, the use of e¢ ciency wages w seems to become relatively more attrac-
tive (compared to a bonus payment) to P in combination with a considerably
risk-averse agent A.
Finally, the applicability of litigation contests as an incentive device also
depends on the way litigation costs are allocated among the parties. So far,
the so-called American Rule has been applied which makes each party bear
its own litigation costs. Contrary to that rule, the English Rule dictates that
the contest loser must pay for both his own costs and those of the winner.
26In this part of the discussion we abstract from the fact that expected gains also
endogenously vary with w or b^, respectively.
27See Kräkel (forthcoming) for the case of a quadratic utility function.
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When applying the English Rule, (1) and (2) have to be rewritten as
D  p (xj; xi)  (xj + xi)  (1  p (xj; xi)) (1)
and   (D + xj + xi)  p (xj; xi) : (2)
The rst-order conditions
(D + xj + xi) p1 (xj; xi)  (1  p (xj; xi)) = 0
and   (D + xj + xi) p2 (xj; xi)  p (xj; xi) = 0
together with the symmetry assumption p (xj; xi) = 1 p (xi; xj)) p2 (xj; xi) =
 p1 (xi; xj) lead again to a symmetric equilibrium (xj; xi) = (x; x) which
is now described by
2 (D + 2x) p1 (x; x) = 1:
A comparison with equation (5) immediately shows that, for a given damage
D, both parties invest more resources under the English Rule than under the
American Rule.28 Hence, going to court becomes less attractive under the
English Rule which has direct implications for Ps objective function (10)
and the corresponding incentive constraint (11). Since for given values of w
and b^ all three gains decrease under the English Rule, the use of an e¢ ciency
wage w becomes more e¤ective (see (11)) whereas setting incentives via b^
becomes less e¤ective (see (11)) and more costly (see (10)). Hence, replacing
the American Rule with the English Rule unambiguously favors the use of
e¢ ciency wages w instead of deferred compensation b^.
28See also, among many others, Farmer and Pecorino (1999).
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5.2 Settlement
In Section 4, we have seen that, in general, the rst-best solution will be
implemented by P if settlement is feasible before the litigation contest starts.
This interesting result is quite robust, as we will show in this subsection. We
begin by assuming w = 0 and b^  0. Then, it is easy to see that the
principals optimization problem can more generally be written as
max
e^;b^
e^  t

b^

(21)
s.t. U

t

b^

= c (e^) :
Here, t

b^

denotes a transfer payment from P to A in the settlement stage
which depends on the promised bonus that the principal refuses to pay ex
post. Further, U () is the agents utility of income, which is assumed to
satisfy U (0) = 0. Note that this problem also contains problem (20) as
a special case where specic assumptions about t

b^

and U () have been
made. Notice further that it is reasonable to assume t (0) = 0: If the principal
does not promise to pay a positive bonus, then she will not pay anything in
the settlement process, too. If, additionally, t

b^

is continuous and there
exists b^ such that U

t

b^

 c  eFB, the rst-best solution will always be
implemented. To see this, note that the rst-best e¤ort eFB is dened as the
e¤ort to be implemented, if e is veriable and, hence, there are no contractual
problems.29 In such a situation, the principal exactly compensates the agent
for his e¤ort costs measured in utility terms  so that A just earns his
zero reservation utility, and implements that e¤ort level which maximizes
the remaining surplus. In other words, P makes As participation constraint
29For the rst-best solution under risk aversion see, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green (1995), p. 481.
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just bind as P has all the bargaining power and extracts the whole surplus
from the contract relationship without any contractual frictions.
Interestingly, this solution is identical with the solution to problem (21)
given by
e^ = eFB 2 argmaxe^  U 1 (c (e^))	 (22)
with U 1 () as the inverse of U
and U

t

b^

= c
 
eFB

:
The principal uses b^ in order to ne-tune the agents transfer payment t

b^

such that the agent is exactly compensated for his e¤ort costs in utility terms,
i.e. U

t

b^

= c (e^), t

b^

= U 1 (c (e^)). The principal then implements
the e¤ort level that maximizes total surplus e^   U 1 (c (e^)). As there are
no e¢ ciency losses, the rst-best outcome can be achieved. Note that the
agents income is not risky (because there is no uncertainty regarding t

b^

).
Hence, rst-best implementation is even possible if the agent is risk-averse.
Besides problem (20), the model considered in this subsection allows for
the possibility of an asymmetric litigation contest as well as the application
of the English rule as special cases. If, for instance, the litigation contest
becomes asymmetric, both the disagreement points as well as the gain from
settlement will change. This a¤ects the agents transfer payment and, accord-
ingly, his incentives. This, however, is anticipated by the parties. Therefore,
they simply change the agreed bonus such that the old incentives are rein-
stalled. Consequently, even in an asymmetric situation, the rst-best solution
is implemented.30 The same holds for the English rule.
30Note, however, that this argumentation only applies, if, under the changed contest
rules, there exists still a bonus satisfying U

t

b^

> c
 
eFB

.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, a contractual relationship is considered which is characterized
by double-sided moral hazard, i.e. both the agent and the principal may
behave opportunistically. However, afterwards the injured party gets the
chance to go to court. In that situation, a litigation contest takes place
where each party can invest resources to win the case. We can show that
the litigation contest restores the incentives for the agent which would be
completely absent without the legal system. Moreover, if the parties can
settle the conict the pure threat of litigation will lead to the implementation
of rst-best e¤ort in a wide range of settings.
The paper o¤ers a rst attempt to combine a principal-agent relation-
ship based on an incomplete contract which cannot make use of a veriable
performance signal with the possibility of using the legal system to enforce
contractual agreements ex-post. The presented model could be extended in
several respects. In particular, we could assume that the agents probabil-
ity of winning the case is an increasing function of chosen e¤ort. Now, we
would have an additional trade-o¤ since choosing e¤ort is advantageous for
the agent concerning a possible litigation, but is detrimental for him since
exerting e¤ort again results in costs which are described by a monotonically
increasing and convex function. Furthermore, the rather abstract modelling
of litigation and settlement could be enriched by borrowing more details from
the existing economic literature on litigation and settlement procedures cited
in the introduction.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we consider the basic model from Section 2 and prove that
the parties never gain from choosing negative values for w or b^. Note rst
that it does not make sense to determine both wage parameters negatively,
as the agent would always reject such a contract.
We therefore start with a situation, where w  0 and b^ > 0. Note that
this changes the model in one way, as now P will not start a litigation contest,
if A under-provides e¤ort, but anything else will remain unchanged. Hence,
As incentive constraint changes to
w +
b^
2
 X

b^

  c (e^)  w
which is always implied by the participation constraint
w +
b^
2
 X

b^

  c (e^)  0;
because of w  0. Accordingly, the participation constraint always binds in
the optimum. The principal now receives the total surplus
e^  c (e^)  2X

b^

and maximizes this surplus subject to the constraint w  0, or, using the
binding participation constraint, to
c (e^) 
 
b^
2
 X

b^
!
 0:
Suppose w to be strictly negative, i.e. the constraint w  0 to be slack.
If e^ < eFB, the principal could marginally increase e^ and increase her prot
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without violating the constraint. Thus, we must have e^ = eFB in case of w <
0 in the optimum. Recall that b^
2
 X

b^

has been dened as G(b^). Note that
G(0) = 0 and that G(b^) is continuous, as both, b^
2
and X

b^

are continuous,
too.31 Notice further that the assumptions e^ = eFB and w < 0 imply that
there exists b^ such thatG(b^) > c
 
eFB

. P chooses the lowest possible value of
b^ for implementing a certain e¤ort level since e^ c (e^) 2X

b^

monotonically
decreases in b^ (i.e. X 0

b^

> 0). From G(0) = 0 and the continuity of G(b^),
it follows that the lowest value for b^ fullling G(b^)  c  eFB lies at a point,
where the constraint binds. This in turn implies that e^ = eFB and w < 0
cannot hold at the same time in the optimum, as, in this case, the principal
could reduce b^ to the lowest b^ solving w = 0. Hence, in the optimum we will
never have w < 0 and b^ > 0. Intuitively, by increasing w from a negative
value to zero, the principal would either gain from being able to induce a
more e¢ cient e¤ort level or by reducing b^ and, accordingly, the litigation
costs.
It remains to show that the parties are never interested in determining
b^ negatively, but w > 0. If b^ < 0, the agent promises the principal to pay
her a bonus, if he sticks to his e¤ort choice. However, the agent is never
going to pay the bonus: In case of having chosen e < e^, A does not have to
pay jb^j. In case of e  e^, A prefers being sued by the principal (resulting in
payo¤ b^
2
 X

 b^

< 0) to paying the bonus (resulting in payo¤ b^ < 0). The
incentive constraint of the agent (concerning the e¤ort choice) is then given
by32
w +
b^
2
 X

 b^

  c (e^)  w
2
 X(w):
31X () is continuous, as p (; ) was assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable. See
condition (5).
32Note that in case of e < e^, P cannot simply claim that e  e^ in order to forego suing
A on w but suing A on b^ later on. This somewhat paradoxical scenario is excluded by the
assumption that only real actions can be circumstantiated with a positive probability.
32
This constraint again implies the participation constraint
w +
b^
2
 X

 b^

  c (e^)  0
and is therefore binding in the optimum. As a consequence, P maximizes
e^  w   b^
2
 X

 b^

subject to hw
2
+X (w)
i
 
"
  b^
2
+X

 b^
#
= c (e^) :
Dene ~b :=  b^. Then, the maximization problem is given by
max
e^;~b;w
EUP = e^  w +
~b
2
 X

~b

s.t.
hw
2
+X (w)
i
 
"
~b
2
+X

~b
#
= c (e^) :
It can easily be seen that we can induce a xed increase in the agents e¤ort
either by increasing w or by decreasing ~b by the same amount. Note, however,
that @EUP
@w
=  1 and  @EUP
@~b
=  0:5 + X 0

~b

. The principals prot is
therefore always reduced more strongly by an increase in w than by the
corresponding decrease in ~b. In the optimum, ~b is thus always determined at
its lowest possible level, i.e. ~b = 0. As ~b =  b^, this means that the parties
are never interested in choosing b^ < 0 and w > 0, which completes our proof.
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